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WHAT'S HAPPENING WITH RESPECT TO THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Thank you. Seated to my left is Professor Gary Shaw, who will
be serving as interlocutor for today's event. He is an authority on
constitutional law and a very important member of our faculty.
Professor Shaw has been consulted by foreign governments for
his expertise in the area of constitutional law and has been a
regular traveler to Belarus, one of the former Soviet Republics,
which is now in the process of drafting its own constitution.
Professor Shaw's function will be to ask questions at the
conclusion of each lecture.
Without further adieu, we shall proceed with our first speaker
who is going to not only tell you some of his experiences, but
also illuminate this conference with some of his thoughts. He will
also moderate the discussion among the first two speakers who
are going to be dealing with the subject of the Fourth and Sixth
Amendments. Touro Law Center is very proud to have achieved
the distinction of bringing to its full-time faculty the Honorable
George C. Pratt of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Judge Pratt remains on senior status, and so both the judiciary
and academic worlds will have the benefit of his wisdom. Judge
Pratt has a very significant background in municipal law as well
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as other areas of law. He is a graduate of Yale Law School,
served as a clerk to Judge Froessel in the New York State Court
of Appeals and served as special counsel for many of the villages
in Nassau County. He has served as special counsel to the

County Board of Supervisors and to other governmental agencies
in Nassau County. It is now my pleasure to introduce to you
Judge Pratt.

Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you, Judge Lazer. It is important to be up-to-date on the
activities of the Supreme Court and, of course, that is the thrust
of the conference today and that is what the other speakers are
going to talk about. However, I have never been one to go with
the flow. What I would like to do is very briefly take a look at
some of the results of what the Supreme Court has previously
done and focus on how some of those cases have played out in
recent Second Circuit decisions. In other words, you might style

my remarks, "What's happening with respect to the Second
Circuit."
The largest group of section 19831 cases that enter into the
federal system, of course, are the police misconduct cases. 2 The
1. 28 U.S.C § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 states:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
2. See, e.g., King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1993). In King, the
defendant sought punitive damages for police misconduct. Id. at 296. At trial
the law enforcement officers "conceded that they used a great deal of force,
including punching [defendant] and forcing him to the floor." Id. Furthermore,
"[defendant] testified that the officers continued to punch him after he was
handcuffed, and that [one] officer.., put him in a choice-hold that made it
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rules and principles that govern these cases are pretty well settled

by now, with the result that on our court we see relatively few
appeals that present nuts-and-bolts-type issues in these
misconduct cases. What that means, I suppose, is that these cases
are now being resolved at the district court level and they simply
do not need our appellate guidance, 3 or should I say, appellate
interference?
The two questions that have been most frequently litigated over
the last year or two, are immunity and municipal liability under
Monell v. Departmentof Social Services.4 Let me focus on those

two for just a moment.
With respect to immunity, the appellate focus on immunity

problems intensified greatly after the Supreme Court's decision in
Mitchell v. Forsyth.5 In Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that it
was permissible to take an interlocutory appeal to the circuit
court whenever the district court denied a defendant's motion to
6
dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity.

difficult for him to breathe." Id. The Second Circuit remanded the case for a
determination on the amount of punitive damages. Id. at 299; Vann v. City of
New York, 1993 VL 404005 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1993). In Vann, the court
granted summary judgment for the City based on plaintiff's claim that an off
duty police officer used excessive force in arresting plaintiff who had left the
scene of an accident which involved the arresting officer. Id. at *1. While the
court stated that "[d]eliberate indifference to police officers' use of excessive
force can constitute a 'policy' creating municipal liability under section
1983... [p]laintiff ... failed to raise a triable issue as to whether the
existence of a municipal policy or custom caused his injuries." Id. at *2, *3;
Brown v. Co Chambers #2023, 1993 WL 307769 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993).
The court stated that a complaint for a claim under section 1983 against a
corrections officer cannot be sustained based on alleged violations of section
1983. Id. at *2; Jermosen v. Coughlin, 1993 WL 267357 (S.D.N.Y. July 9,
1993). The court found that plaintiff's perceived threat by corrections officers
to conduct a strip search was not excessive force actionable under section
1983. Id. at *2.
3. See supra note 2.
4. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court held that a municipality can be found
liable for constitutional violations only when the violation comes about as a
result of the municipality's "policy or custom." Id. at 694.
5. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
6. Id. at 527-28. The Court based its holding in part by stating that:
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Now, there are a number of points about that. The theory
underlying the Supreme Court's decision is that qualified
immunity is not just immunity from damages liability, which up
until Mitchell, everybody had assumed it was. 7 Instead, it was an

immunity from suit, from having to be subjected to meritless
discovery, and from having to go to trial. This created great
consequences in the Supreme Court's view. The Court pointed to
their decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,8 which transformed
qualified immunity from a dual inquiry as to whether there was
subjective good faith and objective good faith. 9 They made it a
[It follows from the recognition that qualified immunity is in part an
entitlement not to be forced to litigate the consequences of official
conduct that a claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits
of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated. An appellate
court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need
not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor
even determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim.
All it need determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms
allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time
of the challenged actions or, in cases where the district court has denied
summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that even under the
defendant's version of the facts the defendant's conduct violated clearly
established law, whether the law clearly proscribed the actions the
defendant claims he took.
Id.

7. See Washington Square Post #1212 Am. Legion v. Maduro, 907 F.2d
1288, 1290-91 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Qualified immunity has long shielded
government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages
liability 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))).
8. 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
9. Id. at 815. The Court stated:
Decisions of this Court have established that the 'good faith' defense has
both an 'objective' and a 'subjective' aspect. The objective element
involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for 'basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights.' The subjective component refers to
'permissible intentions.' Characteristically the Court has defined these
elements by identifying the circumstances in which qualified immunity
would not be available. Referring both to the objective and subjective
elements, we have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an
official 'knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
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question of law by saying the test is one that is purely
objective.10 We do not care what was really going on in the mind

of the public official, we just wanted to know what would the
reasonable official have done and thought and believed under the
circumstances. 1 1 And then the question is, would a reasonable

official realize that what was done violated clearly established
constitutional law?
It has been said that what the Court established under Harlow
was that the only public officials that can be held liable are those
who are either malicious in what they do, or plainly incompetent
because they do not know what they are doing. 12 In any event,
the Harlow test was made a legal test rather than a factual one,
chiefly so that it could be resolved on a motion for summary
judgment. 13

within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or
other injury .... '
Id. (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
10. Id. at 818. The Court held that "government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) ("As the
qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.").
13. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The Harlow Court stated that:
[r]eliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as
measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive
disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial
claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge
appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but
whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not
reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor
could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not
previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity question
is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.
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There are several consequences which stem from the Mitchell
opinion. First, there has been a great increase in the number of
appeals in section 1983 cases. In almost every case, after the
motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency, there is a motion -usually on summary judgment - to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds. 14 This is in cases against the individual officers, not
against the municipality. 15 The second consequence is that if a
case goes the full route to judgment, it involves three appeals.
One on qualified immunity, another on the merits and a third on

attorneys' fees, thus multiplying the appellate litigation that is
related to these cases.
Another consequence is that the Supreme Court has set up the
means for making a kind of end run around the final judgment
rule in the federal courts. In Siegert v. Gilley, 16 the Court said

that district and circuit courts should not address the qualified
immunity issue until they have determined whether or not a
constitutional right has been violated by the conduct that is at
issue. 17 Now, in practical effect, look at the motion to dismiss
14. See, e.g., Magnotti v. Kuntz, 918 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1990) (denying
motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity defense);
Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of
motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity defense); Del A. v.
Edwards, 855 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1988) (denying motion for dismissal or
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds).
15. See, e.g., Magnotti, 918 F.2d at 366 (suit against police officer);
Alexander, 916 F.2d at 1394-95 (suit against prison warden and administrative
systems manager); Del A., 855 F.2d at 1150 (suit against state governor and
officials); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., 844 F.2d 714
(10th Cir. 1988) (suit against individual officials of a private corporation and
the United States Department of Energy).
16. 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991).
17. Id. at 1793. The Court stated that
[a] necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the
constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is 'clearly established' at the
time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has
asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all. Decision of this
purely legal question permits courts expeditiously to weed out suits
which fail the test without requiring a defendant who rightly claims
qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time consuming
preparation to defend the suit on its merits. One of the purposes of
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that is generally made at the beginning of one of these cases. It
assumes that what the plaintiff says is true and urges that there is

no violation of the constitutional right. Therefore, the motion is
denied, but no appeal, because it is not a final judgment. Then
you make the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.

That motion is also denied, but you can appeal because of

Mitchell.18 Under Siegert, however, the Court is then supposed

to look back and see whether there is a violation of a
constitutional right, so at that point you are getting, in effect,
appellate review of the denial of the motion to dismiss - quite
contrary to what the former system was. 19
Another consequence is that in other cases, the Court has
extended the immediate appealability not just to qualified
immunity, but also to absolute immunity cases 20 as well as
Eleventh Amendment immunity cases. 2 1 On a more institutional
level, the effect of the interlocutory appeal combined with the
immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only
unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed
upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit.
Id.
18. Mitchell, 472 U.S at 530. The Court held that "a district court's denial
of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law,
is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Id.
19. Siegert, 111 S. Ct. at 1793. The Court held "that the petitioner in this
case failed to satisfy the first inquiry in the examination of such a claim; he
failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right." Id.
20. See, e.g., Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525. The Mitchell Court held that "the
denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before
final judgment, for the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's
entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action."
Id.; see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). In deciding the issue
of whether it had jurisdiction over an appeal from a non-final order in which
the district court had rejected the petitioner's claim of absolute immunity, the
Nitxon Court held that the denial of the absolute immunity defense was
immediately appealable. Id. at 742.
21. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc., 113 S.Ct. 684, 685 (1993). The Court allowed an immediate appeal
from a district court order which denied an Eleventh Amendment claim of
immunity from a suit brought in federal court and likened it to the immediate
appealablity available to qualified immunity found in Mitchell. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

7

304

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1994], Art. 3

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

rule of qualified immunity (that you are immune unless what you
have done violates clearly established law), 22 has retarded the
development and evolution of constitutional doctrine in the circuit
courts. The issue is not "what is the constitutional issue?"
Instead, it is a question of whether the defendant violated law that
was clearly established. If there is any doubt about it, then there
is qualified immunity and the case is dismissed. 23 So we cannot
take the next step and establish what the law is, with the result
that in the next case you still do not know what the clearly
established law was. The whole thrust and development of the
law in this area has been very much defendant-oriented and
protects defendants, and it has, as I said, retarded the evolution
of constitutional doctrine.
Another and final point on this is an institutional consideration.
The qualified immunity interlocutory appeal is an example of
another type of erosion of the final judgment rule that governs
appeals in the federal system. In my opinion, and in the opinion
of most appellate judges, and I suspect most district judges as
well, the final judgment rule is one of the major strong points in
the federal system as compared to other systems, such as the
New York State system where so many rulings by trial judges
can be appealed to the appellate division before a final
judgment. 24 The appeals slow down litigation, detract from the
22. See, e.g., Rogue-Rodriguez v. Lema Moya, 926 F.2d 103, 107 (1st
Cir. 1991) (finding interlocutory appeal limited to reversing denial of summary
judgment based on qualified immunity and does not allow for ruling on due

process claim); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1108 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2827 (1991) (holding that defendant-police officers
who allegedly violated constitutional rights of a woman by failing to protect
her were entitled to qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal); Alvarado v.
Zayas, 816 F.2d 818, 820 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding on interlocutory appeal that
Social Services Secretary was entitled to qualified immunity from liability
stemming from First Amendment and due process claims).
23. See supra note 22.

24. See, e.g., Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1984)
The Court noted that:
The final judgment rule serves several important interests. It helps
preserve the respect due trial judges by minimizing appellate-court

interference with the numerous decisions they must make in the prejudgment stages of litigation. It reduces the ability of litigants to harass
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authority of the trial judge, and generally seem to reduce the
efficiency of the judicial system. 25 The great virtue in the federal
approach has been that the district judge runs the case until it is
over, and the appellate court then takes over and determines
whether there were any errors of law that are significant enough
to warrant reversal. That system is being eroded, and this
Mitchell v. Forsyth decision is a major contributor to the
26
erosion.

The other major group of section 1983 issues that come before
the Second Circuit is municipal liability under Monell.27 In one
sense this is related to qualified immunity because qualified
immunity tends to knock out the individual defendants. 2 8 The
opponents and to clog the courts through a succession of costly and
time-consuming appeals. It is crucial to the efficient administration of
justice.
Id.; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940) ("Finality as a
condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure.
It was written into the first Judiciary Act and has been departed from only
when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all.").
25. See, e.g., Appeal of Licht & Semonoff, 796 F.2d 564, 569 (1st Cir.
1986) (stating that the purpose of the § 1291 requirement which limits
appellate review to final judgment is to reduce the costs of litigation, promote
judicial efficiency and eliminate delays that interlocutory appeals cause); Servo
Corp. of Am. v. General Elec. Co., 393 F.2d 551, 557 (4th Cir. 1968)
(stating that to bring about judicial efficiency and reduce litigation to
manageable size a court can make separate determinations of multiple issues).
26. See, e.g., Yates v. City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444, 448 (6th Cir.
1991) (stating that Mitchell appeals can be used to purposely delay trial); Abel
v. Miller, 904 F.2d 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1990) (warning courts of appeals to be
careful with Mitchell appeals because they may be used to defeat claims by
prolonging trials and incurring undue expenses on plaintiffs); Apostol v.
Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1338-39 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that defendants who
do not have genuine claims of immunity may use Mitchell appeals to stall trials
to gain from postponement by increasing plaintiff's expense).
27. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
28. See, e.g., Deagle v. City of New York, 1992 VL 116368 (S.D.N.Y.
May 24, 1992) at *1 (finding that defendant has qualified immunity does not
preclude finding that "municipal defendants" may be liable); Doe v. Sullivan
County, 956 F.2d 545, 553 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 187 (1992)
(stating that a municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity and thus may
still be liable even after dismissal of claim after showing of qualified immunity
for an officer); Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir.
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response of practicing attorneys is, "Well, if we can't get the
individual defendant, let's go after the municipality." In short,
Plaintiff's attorneys are pushing the envelope of municipal
liability as much as possible, because the individual claims are
barred for one reason or another.
A claim against a municipality is a much more difficult claim to
present from the plaintiff's point of view; it is more difficult to
defend from the defendant's point of view, and it is infinitely
29
more difficult to try from a trial judge's point of view.
Basically that is because a municipality, of course, can be held
liable only if there is a municipal policy that causes the
constitutional violation, and if the municipality was deliberately
30
indifferent to the constitutional harm that the policy has caused.
Three recent cases in the Second Circuit illustrate this trend to
reach out toward the municipality. One is Sorlucco v. New York
City Police Department.31 In Sorlucco, potential municipal
liability was to be based upon a custom concerning discipline
inflicted on police officers. 32 The claim was that the custom
1986) (stating that a Monell claim survives finding that officer was acquitted
due to good faith immunity).
29. See generally City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).
Regarding municipal liability, the Court stated that:
Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant
respect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of its
inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city
'policy or custom' that is actionable under § 1983 .... Only where a
failure to train reflects a 'deliberate' or 'conscious' choice by a
municipality--a 'policy' as defined by our prior cases--can a city be
liable for such a failure under § 1983.
Id.
30. See, e.g., Fiaco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987) (holding that a municipality may be
subjected to § 1983 liability if policy tolerates unconstitutional acts); Owen v.
Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., County of
Nassau v. Owens, 444 U.S. 980 (1979). In Owen, the second circuit stated that
"[i]t is true that the failure to train or supervise law enforcement officers must
be so grossly negligent as to constitute 'deliberate indifference' to hold the
county liable." Id.
31. 971 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1992).
32. Id. at 870.
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discriminated against women. 33 The facts were essentially that a
woman police officer claimed she had been raped by a male
police officer. 34 The incident occurred in the woman's
apartment. 35 She had left her police revolver on the dresser. 36
When the situation became amorous and she resisted his
advances, he grabbed her revolver and to force her submission,
he fired it a couple of times into the mattress directly next to
her. 37 When she made her complaint, she was disciplined for
taking improper care of her revolver. 3 8 The male officer, I
believe, was promoted and eventually retired. When the case
came to our court, we finally approved the possibility of
establishing that this was not just an isolated instance of how they
run things in the disciplinary affairs of the New York City Police
Department. Rather, there was sufficient evidence to determine
whether or not this was the result of a custom or policy of the
39
City, and if so, then the City would be held liable.
In another case, Walker v. City of New York,40 defendant
served 19 years in prison, and then it came out that a detective
had lied on the witness stand.4 1 The Assistant District Attorney
who tried the case knew that he had lied. 42 The prosecutor had
absolute immunity, so the claim was asserted against the
municipality for failure to train. 43 Remember, this trial occurred
twenty years ago when Brady v. Maryland44 had first come
down, and the claim was that the City did not properly train its
33. Id. at 865.
34. Id. at 865-66.

35. Id. at 865.
36. Id. at 865-66.
37. Id. 866.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 872-73.

40. 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1412 (1993).
41. Id. at 295.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Court held that "suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87.
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assistant district attorneys in their obligations to turn over
exculpatory material to defense counsel before the trial. 45 We
reversed the district court's dismissal of the disciplinary charges
and remanded for further proceedings. 46 Potentially that claim
can succeed if it ever goes to trial.
The third case is Dwares v. City of New York. 47 The claim in
Dwares was sort of an offshoot of the DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services48 case. In DeShaney,
Social Services had some notes that a child was being abused by
his father. 49 They had even taken him into custody at one time,
but they finally turned him back to the father. 50 Then he was
severely abused, and ended up severely brain damaged. 5 1 When
the boy's mother tried to collect from Social Services, the
Supreme Court of the United States said there was no affirmative
duty on the part of a municipality to protect the child against
harm being inflicted by a parent. 52 You need something more
than just notice that something is going to happen. 53
In any event, the Dwares case was an offshoot of that. A
bystander at a flag burning event was assaulted by a group of
skinheads. 54 The claim was that the police officers essentially
knew that there was going to be violence. 55 Plaintiff alleged that
there had been a meeting between the leader of the skinheads and
the police and that the police had stated that they would not
interfere unless the skinheads "got completely out of control." 56
It happened that the one who was harmed in this particular
instance was not burning the flag; he was only there to watch

45. Walker, 974 F.2d at 294.
46. Id. at 300.
47. 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993).

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 200.
Dwares, 985 F.2d at 96.
Id.
Id. at 97.
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what was going on.57 I am not sure where his sympathies lay, but
they certainly were not with the police in the end, because the

police stood by while he was beaten by skinheads. 58 On motion,
our court held that municipal liability could be established under
these circumstances if it could be established that the arrangement
between the skinheads and the police was made at a high enough
level to fairly be the policy of a city. 5 9
These are just some examples of the phenomenon of more and

more municipal liability cases that are at the fringe. Plaintiffs are
reaching, and frankly, they are pushing the envelope to establish

municipal liability. It is largely a response to the fact that you
cannot get the individual officer in many cases because the

qualified immunity protects them.
One other comment: the substantive claim that most frequently
seems to have come to our court in the last couple of years is a

retaliation claim, mostly arising out of employment contexts. 60 A
couple of other cases, typical whistle-blower cases, are DiMarco
v. Rome Hospital,6 1 and Vasbinder v. Scott.6 2 Finally, there was
57. Id. at 96.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 100.
60. See Piesco v. Koch, 12 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding sufficient
evidence existed to support former New York City Deputy Director of
Examination's claim of retaliatory dismissal based on statements made during
committee meetings to evaluate testing procedures); Saulpaugh v. Monroe
Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding INS employer
liability for retaliatory discharge of employee following claims of sexual
harassment); Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1992)
(finding the elimination of plaintiff's position as a supernumerary police officer
was a retaliatory act for plaintiff's public defense of police chief on
controversial issue).
61. 952 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1992). The DiMarcocourt stated that in order
[t]o determine whether the plaintiff has a valid claim of retaliation for
public speech, the district court must determine, first, whether the
speech related to a matter of public concern. If it did, the district court
must then engage in a very subtle balancing test-the degree of public
concern expressed by the speaker must be weighed against 'the
government's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities to the public. '
Id. at 666 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983)).
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63
the interesting case of Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill. Up in
Connecticut they have a position called a supernumerary police
officer. 64 This particular officer, Mr. Goldberg, criticized some
of the politicians in town, taking a political stance. 65 The result
was that the town voted to abolish his job. 66 The suit claimed
67
that this was retaliation, a violation of the First Amendment.
The members of the town legislative body were entitled to
absolute immunity because this was a legislative act. 68 So the
claim was brought against the town itself and the town said,
"We, too, are entitled to absolute immunity." 69 It was clear that

towns are not entitled to qualified immunity under the Supreme
Court's decision in Owen v. City of Independence,70 but the issue
62. 976 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1992). In a section 1983 case for punitive
damages where plaintiff claimed he was discharged from employment and
reassigned to lesser position with reduction in salary in violation of his First
Amendments rights, the Second Circuit stated that
an award should not be so high as to result in the financial ruin of the
defendant. Nor should it constitute a disproportionately large percentage
of a defendant's net worth. Thus, while a defendant's conduct is
obviously germane to the damages issue, 'even outrageous conduct will
not support an oppressive or patently excessive award of damages.'
Further, because neither compensation nor enrichment is a valid purpose
of punitive damages, an award should not be so large as to constitute 'a
windfall to the individual litigant.'
Id.at 121 (citations omitted).
63. 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1992).
64. Id. at 71
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 72.
69. Id. at 71.
70. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). In Owen, the Supreme Court stated that
[w]here the immunity claimed by the defendant was well established at
common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, and where its rationale
was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we have
construed the statute to incorporate that immunity. But there is no
tradition of immunity for municipal corporations, and neither history
nor policy supports a construction of § 1983 that would justify the
qualified immunity accorded the city of Independence by the Court of
Appeals. We hold, therefore, that the municipality may not assert the
good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under § 1983.
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had never been raised on absolute immunity. Not only that, under
Connecticut law, legislators have a privilege not to testify as to
what their motives are, and the whole issue in a retaliation case is
motive. 71 Why did they abolish the job? The town said, "If we
do not have immunity, we are defenseless because our legislators
will not testify." 72
Our court's response was: "You do not have absolute
immunity; if you did, then Monell would be meaningless because
we could not hold the municipality liable for anything but the
most formal legislative policies." 73 Motive is relevant now in
many issues of constitutional law, such as racial discrimination,
free speech, and the Establishment Clause under the First
Amendment; and we are dealing here with a federal claim, not a
state claim. The state privilege cannot operate to defeat the
federal claim. 74
All right, those are just some random observations as to what is
happening out there - I was going to say in the trenches, but the
trenches are really the district courts. The circuit court is one
step behind. Nevertheless, these are some of the consequences of
what the Supreme Court has done to, or for, us over the past
several years.
Id. at 638.
71. Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 74.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 74. The court held "that there is no immunity defense, either
qualified or absolute, available to a municipality sought to be held liable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983[," and to claim otherwise is a "clear avoidance of the
inference from Monell and Owen." Id.; see also Monell v. Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (stating that immunity does not attach
to legislators sued in their official capacity because "official capacity suits
generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent .... "); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 651 (1980) (cautioning that "granting immunity to municipalities would
mean that many victims of municipal malfeasance would be left
remediless .... ").
74. Owen, 445 U.S. at 647-48. Supporting this premise, the Court stated
that "[b]y including municipalities within the class of 'person' subject to
liability for violations of the federal Constitution and laws, Congress - the
supreme sovereign on matters of federal law - abolished whatever vestige of
the state's sovereign immunity the municipality possessed ..
").
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